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Abstract
On October 1st, 2015, the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD-10) will be mandatorily implemented in the United States. Although this medical
classification system will allow healthcare professionals to code with greater accuracy,
specificity, and detail, these codes will have a significant impact on the flavor of healthcare
insurance claims. While the overall benefit of ICD-10 throughout the healthcare industry is
unquestionable, some experts believe healthcare fraud detection and prevention could experience
an initial drop in performance due to the implementation of ICD-10. We aim to quantitatively
test the validity of this concern regarding an adverse transitional impact. This project explores
how predictive fraud detection systems developed using ICD-9 claims data will initially react to
the introduction of ICD-10. We have developed a basic fraud detection system incorporating
both unsupervised and supervised learning methods in order to examine the potential fraudulence
of both ICD-9 and ICD-10 claims in a predictive environment. Using this system, we are able to
analyze the ability and performance of statistical methods trained using ICD-9 data to properly
identify fraudulent ICD-10 claims. This research makes contributions to the domains of medical
coding, healthcare informatics, and fraud detection.
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Introduction

1.1

Motivation

The process of medical classification and coding has been used for centuries to efficiently
gather statistical data in an effort to measure the frequent causations of morality. The
International List of Causes of Death, the first edition of international medical classification, was
formally adopted in 1893. This classification system eventually evolved into the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD), which has been maintained by the World Health Organization
(WHO) since 1948. The ICD code set allows both mortality and morbidity conditions to be
described and tracked, and ten revisions to this system have been published to date1.
Today, when an individual is seen or treated by a healthcare professional, a series of
alphanumeric codes are still used to describe the medical diagnoses and services provided. This
designated classification structure, the ninth iteration of ICD, implements the use of coding for
healthcare management, public health and medical informatics, and insurance purposes. ICD-9
has been the coding standard in the healthcare industry since October 1st, 1984. The primary
purpose of ICD-9 is to translate written information from a patient’s clinical statement regarding
diagnoses and inpatient procedures into a series of universally understandable designations.
The ICD-9 code set contains approximately 13,000 distinct codes. Each ICD-9 code
consists of a minimum of three digits and a maximum of five digits, with a decimal point after
the third digit if more than three digits are used. Figure 1 illustrates the standard format of an
ICD-9 code. The first three digits represent a single disease entity, or a group of similar or
closely related conditions. The fourth digit identifies a subcategory, providing additional
information regarding the etiology, site, or disease manifestation. Lastly, the fifth digit offers
sub-classification of the subcategory, describing for example the mode of diagnosis or the
anatomical site. ICD-9 is primarily numeric, with the exception of supplementary V-codes and
E-codes. V-codes, characterized by a “V” as the first digit, are used when a patient seeks health
care for reasons other than illness or injury. E-codes describe external causation of injury,
poisoning, and adverse reactions, and where, why, and how an injury occurred. The structure of
injuries described by ICD-9 codes are designated by the wound type, and the code omits
laterality (left or right). An example of an ICD-9 code is 812.21, which describes a closed
fracture of the shaft of the humerus. The first three digits, 812, describe a fracture of the
humerus. The fourth and fifth digits offer greater detail, describing a closed fracture on the shaft.

(1)
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On October 1st, 2015, the new ICD-10 diagnosis and procedure coding system will take
effect in the United States. This implementation, which was originally scheduled to occur in
October of 2011, has been delayed multiple times in an effort to allow the industry to become
fully prepared. ICD-10 differs significantly from ICD-9 in terms of structure and organization.
The composition of the updated clinical coding system promotes a higher level of detail and
specificity, which will better capture and describe necessary medical data [36]. The additional
information provided by ICD-10 should ideally allow all parties involved, i.e. patients, providers,
clearinghouses, and insurance companies, to operate in a more effective and efficient manner.
The ICD-10 code set contains approximately 68,000 distinct codes, more than five times
the number of possible ICD-9 codes. Each ICD-10 code consists of a minimum of three digits
and a maximum of seven digits, with a decimal point after the third digit if more than three digits
are used. Figure 2 illustrates the standard format of an ICD-10 code. The first three digits
represent the category, the fourth, fifth, and sixth digits represent the location, and the seventh
digit identifies an extension. Similar to ICD-9, the three digits to the immediate right of the
decimal describe the etiology, anatomic site, and the severity. The seventh extension digit
describes the visit encounter or sequel for injures and external causes. The first digit is always
alphabetic, with the exception of the letter “U,” the second digit is always numeric, and the
remaining five digits are alphanumeric. The character “X” is used as a placeholder character,
allowing for the future expansion of particular codes. V-codes and E-codes have been
eliminated from the ICD-10 code set, and are now incorporated in the main code set. The
structure of injuries described by ICD-10 codes are designated by the location/body part, and
laterality is included. The ICD-10 equivalent of the ICD-9 code 812.21 described earlier is
S42.321A. “S42” identifies the injury as a displaced transverse fracture. The number “3”
specifies the fracture as a humerus fracture, the number “2” indicates the fracture is located on
the shaft of the humerus, and the number “1” indicates the injury was sustained on the patient’s
right arm. An “A” extension signals that this is an initial encounter for the closed fracture for
this particular patient.

(2)

Thirty years ago, when ICD-9 was first introduced, data needs were dramatically
diminished. The applications for coded medical data today go well beyond the purposes for
which ICD-9-CM was originally designed. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) have outlined the nine primary advantages ICD-10 will provide2. ICD-10 is superior to
ICD-9 with respect to:
1. Measuring the quality, safety, and efficacy of care
2. Designing payment systems and processing claims for reimbursement
3. Conducting research, epidemiological studies, and clinical trials
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Setting health policy
Operational and strategic planning and designing healthcare delivery systems
Monitoring resource utilization
Improving clinical, financial, and administrative performance
Preventing and detecting healthcare fraud and abuse
Tracking public concerns and assessing risks of adverse public health events

The eighth item in the list above, the prevention and detection of healthcare fraud and
abuse, is an aspect of ICD-10 that is studied throughout the course of this research project. The
topic of healthcare fraud and abuse is discussed in further detail in the following subsection.

1.2

Background

Due to the nature of these coding languages, both ICD-9 and ICD-10 lend themselves to
exploitation by physicians and/or providers. Social insurance programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid, and private insurance companies allocate payment according to the clinical codes
provided in healthcare claims. When codes are intentionally misrepresented, inappropriate
monetary returns can potentially be distributed. Situations involving financially motivated
deception are considered to be instances of healthcare fraud and abuse.
Fraud and abuse within the healthcare arena have occurred in numerous schematic forms,
but there are nine primary strategies that have been identified as both prevalent and advantageous
in the medical field [37]. These popular schemes are listed below.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Billing for services not rendered
Upcoding of services
Upcoding of items
Duplicate claims
Unbundling
Excessive services
Unnecessary services
Kickbacks and bribery

During this research project, we focused on the detection of billing for services not
rendered, unbundling, and billing for excessive or unnecessary services. These particular
schemes, numbers 1, 5, and 6, were chosen due to their potential affiliation with the medical
claims data we had access to. The process of determining which types of fraud to concentrate
on, referred to as goal setting, is a topic reviewed in Section 2.1.2.
In order to avoid the improper payment of fraudulent healthcare claims, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and private companies such as Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, United Healthcare, and Humana use aggregations of analytical algorithms for detection
and prevention. These machine learning algorithms can generally be divided into two main
categories: supervised learning and unsupervised learning. Both groups are discussed in further
detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Supervised statistical methods are commonly used to analyze
current and historical data and patterns in an effort to accurately predict future, unknown events
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and outcomes. The dynamic nature of these techniques allows a continuous increase in
performance and accuracy to occur. When ICD-10 is introduced in October of 2015, these
systems, constructed using past ICD-9 data and trends, will essentially be reset, and the accuracy
of fraud detection could potentially deteriorate until a proper amount of ICD-10 data is
accumulated [29]. The unknown impact of implementation is a serious threat to the predictive
modeling necessary to properly identify fraudulent behavior [4, 18]. ICD-10 will undoubtedly
benefit the entire industry once the transitional period has past, but healthcare insurance
providers will encounter challenges during the infantile period regarding the accurate detection
of fraud [8].

1.3

Research Goals

To the best of our knowledge, the future impact of ICD-10 on predictive fraud detection
has yet to be studied in any quantifiable manner. Domain experts have suggested that the initial
lack of ICD-10 training data could lead to the inaccurate recognition of abnormal medical
claims, but no original, published analysis has examined this possibility. ICD-9 diagnosis and
procedure codes have played an important role in the majority of past healthcare fraud research
projects. Researchers have identified these codes as prevalent metrics that should be
incorporated in the algorithms, models, and systems used to detect fraud [2]. However, the
transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 and the potential effect it will have these metrics has been
generally overlooked. The objective of this research is to bridge the gap between existing
healthcare fraud detection research and the industry’s transition to ICD-10.
We evaluated this transitional impact through the use of logistic regression analysis,
coupled with an outlier detection model. Due to the nature of healthcare claims data that is
available to the public, data containing labels indicating fraud is extremely difficult to acquire.
Claims identified as fraudulent by insurance companies and agencies are typically redacted from
data that is eventually published, because they are both unlawful and illegitimate. Through the
application of outlier detection, we were able to label medical claims data in an unsupervised
manner for the purpose of supervised learning. The first phase of the experiment provides the
labeled training data necessary to perform regression analysis. The development of a logistic
regression model, the second phase, allowed us to study the influence of ICD-10 in a predictive
environment.
This project explores the validity of predictions from domain professionals regarding fraud
detection and the implementation of the ICD-10 code set. The notion that fraud detection
systems using supervised learning algorithms will encounter an initial decline in performance
due to ICD-10 is fairly unsupported at the moment. We claim that the results from our
experiment will provide evidence that will support this notion of an initial negative transitional
impact.
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1.4

Approach

A year’s worth of medical claims were first grouped into a smaller number of clinically
meaningful categories according to their diagnosis and procedure codes. An outlier detection
algorithm was then used to identify anomalies present in each of the groups based on the amount
billed to a given payer, and those abnormal claims were flagged as fraudulent. The sole purpose
of this process was to create the labeled training data necessary to construct a supervised learning
model.
After the process of generating training data was complete, a logistic regression model
served as a predictive tool that mimicked the predictive capabilities of existing fraud detection
and prevention systems being used within the industry. A second year’s worth of claims data
was analyzed, and probable instances of fraud were flagged. ICD-9 codes, attributes of each
claim, were translated into ICD-10 using crosswalks, and the modified dataset was re-analyzed.
We found that eliminating two covariates caused the logistic regression models to flag a
significant number of both false-positive and false-negative healthcare claims as fraudulent.
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2

Related Work

2.1

Healthcare Data

The implementation of the electronic health record (EHR) has allowed healthcare
organizations to collect and externally report/provide a greater amount of data to the public
sector. The EHR is a systematic collection of electronic health information about an individual
patient or population, and can include a range of data, including demographics, medical history,
medication and allergies, immunization status, laboratory test results, radiology images, vital
signs, personal statistics, and billing information. Fraud detection research in the field of
healthcare management has primarily concentrated on medical billing data, which is derived
from the EHR. After a patient’s medical record is updated by a physician or staff member,
diagnosis and procedure codes are assigned by a medical coder. The appropriate medical codes
and necessary data from the EHR are incorporated into an ANSI 837 file, which is submitted to
the payer directly or via a clearinghouse. An insurance company is usually the recipient of this
claim file, so the majority of suitable fraud detection data comes from health insurance agencies.
2.1.1

Sources

Healthcare fraud literature originating from countries outside of the United States have
used a variety of sources to acquire medical claims data. The National Health Insurance
Administration (NHIA) in Taiwan has provided data to multiple research groups [6, 16, 22, 38,
42], and the NHIA equivalent in South Korea, the National Health Insurance (NHI) system, has
also contributed to studies [34]. Two major Australian governmental health departments, the
Health Insurance Commission (HIC) and Medicare Australia, have been reported as the sources
of data in numerous pertinent research projects [14, 15, 31, 32, 36, 39]. Healthcare claims data
from private insurance companies located in Turkey and Chile has also been used by several
researchers [17, 19, 28].
Within the United States, various agencies within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) have been involved with research exploring the detection and prevention of
healthcare fraud. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and its predecessor,
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), both supplied members of academia with
Medicare and Medicaid data [11, 23, 25, 33]. Researchers in the United States have also worked
with private insurance companies and hospitals, using data collected by these organizations [24,
27].
2.1.2

Preprocessing

The raw healthcare insurance data provided by any governmental health department or
private agency is rarely organized in such a way that the researcher is satisfied with the structure.
In order to appropriately arrange and organize the data, preprocessing must occur. The raw data
must be processed into a form that is suitable for the statistical methods being used. Although
this task is both extremely time-consuming and challenging, the process is infrequently
documented, explicitly described in only two pieces of literature [21, 35]. Using aggregated
information from these two papers and various other unrelated external sources, Li, Huang, Jin,
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and Shi constructed the following flowchart, Figure 3, which outlines the steps commonly
involved with preprocessing [20].
(3)
The purpose of goal setting is to determine which forms of healthcare fraud, identified in
Section 1.2, are of interest and/or concern. Detection can then be tailored to focus on these
particular schemes. Typically, domain experts assist in this process of prioritization, having both
the knowledge and the resources to gauge the frequency and financial loss associated with
different types of fraud. The medical claims data used during the experimentation phase must
then correspond to the forms of fraud selected. This step is rarely discussed in relevant literature,
but has likely occurred in some capacity during every documented research project involving
healthcare fraud detection. Sokol, Garcia, West, Rodriguez and Johnson met with representatives
from the HCFA and the Office of the Inspector General, and ultimately decided to focus on six
fraudulent schemes that could be properly identified using available HCFA data [35].
Capelleveen used the input provided by Medicaid fraud experts to zero-in on the most prevalent
schemes found in Medicaid dental claims [5].
Flaws within healthcare claims data and irrelevant views of the data can cause significant
issues during the training of a statistical model, the grouping of abnormal claims, or the
identification of suspicious instances. Resolving inconsistent representations of the same
concept, appropriately handling missing values, and transforming raw data into a flattened table
format are all vital steps of the preprocessing phase. The data used in our research had already
undergone cleaning, imputation, and transformation by the vendor. Therefore, these three stages
of the preprocessing method will not be discussed.
In order to maximize the discrimination power of any given statistical method being
employed in a fraud detection capacity, features, also known as metrics or predictors, must be
selected from the original data attributes that will provide the information necessary to separate
fraudulent and legitimate claims. Feature selection can be done manually with the assistance of
domain experts, or computationally using machine learning algorithms. Most researchers
working in the healthcare domain consult with experts to identify discriminating metrics. Due to
the sensitive nature of this classified information, this process is usually redacted in the literature
by the authors. Ortega, Figueroa, and Ruz published the procedure they used, but were unable to
include the features that they ultimately selected [28]. This group worked with domain experts
to first define a preliminary set of features, correlation checks were then performed to delete
redundant features, and lastly, the discriminating power of each feature was tested. Only those
features with discriminating power above a certain predefined threshold were selected.
The auditing of data to assess both quality and utility is an important conclusion to the
preprocessing method. Researchers use statistical software such as SAS, SPSS, Stata, and R to
execute basic statistical analysis and visualization in an effort to become familiar with the data.
Every research group referenced so far performed some form of data auditing before conducting
their respective experiments.
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2.2

Statistical Modeling Involving Supervised Learning

Supervised learning is a category of machine learning algorithms that uses training data
to make predictions. Training data consists of both input data as well as corresponding response
values. Using this known information, supervised learning algorithms develop models that can
predict response values for instances in an unknown set of data. These algorithms benefit from
larger sets of training data, which allows them to construct models with higher predictive power
that can generalize more accurately.
2.2.1

Support Vector Machines

Using a set of training data where each instance is identified as being fraudulent or nonfraudulent, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) constructs a model that assigns new healthcare
claims to one of the two categories. The SVM creates a hyperplane, and each training data
instance is represented as a point in space. The functional margin, the distance to the nearest
training instance in either category, should be as large as possible. When the functional margin
is maximized, a clear gap will exist between the two categories, which will minimize the
generalization error of the SVM. Each new claim is mapped onto the hyperplane, and its
location in the functional margin determines if the claim is deemed fraudulent or non-fraudulent.
Both research groups that have used SVMs relied on the standard linear classification ability of
the SVM to detect abnormal healthcare claims. Kirlidog and Asuk used longitudinal data that
spanned a nine year period, marking records that had a probability of anomaly greater than 0.5 as
anomalous [17]. Of the 808,348 records spanning from 2001 to 2009, 6,595 claims had
probabilities ranging from 0.5 to 0.673. These anomalous claims were analyzed according to
three primary criteria: the status of the claim (rejected or accepted), the excessivity in terms of
the bill amount of the claim compared to other claims from the same type of health center, and
the excessivity of the claim compared to other claims from a particular health center. The
purpose of this analysis was to examine the rejected-anomalous relationship and the possibility
of initiating investigations based off the relative excessivity of claims. Kumar, Ghani, and Mei
addressed concept drift, the scenario when the relation between the input data and the target
variable changes over time, and the evolution of the target function by using seasonal subsets of
their data, instead of longitudinal data [19]. A system was proposed that minimized payment
errors made by insurance companies by predicting claims that needed to be reworked using
SVMs. They found that this system produced an order of magnitude better precision over
existing detection approaches, and this in turn could potentially save insurance companies $15 to
$25 million each year.
2.2.2

Artificial Neural Networks

An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a graph consisting of nodes and edges that is
organized into layers. Each layer is made up of a number of interconnected nodes which contain
an activation function. Training data containing known instances of fraud is presented to the
ANN via the input layer, which in turn communicates to one or more of the hidden layers. The
adaptive weights of the edges are tuned by a learning algorithm according to the input training
data. The hidden layers are connected to the output layer, which identifies new records as
fraudulent or non-fraudulent. ANN’s are generally used to approximate functions that are
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unknown and depend on a large number of inputs. In the case of fraud detection, the normality
of each new claim is unknown, and the input is typically a large collection of medical claim
features. A two-layer neural network, the standard Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) consisting of
an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer, is the most-commonly used ANN. Oretga,
Figueroa, and Ruz originally modeled each fraud problem using a standard MLP and small
hidden layers, but the variance of each model was too high [28]. A committee of 10 multi-layer
neural networks replaced the standard MLP, and the variance was appropriately reduced. Their
proposed system assigned a committee to each of the four entities primarily involved with
healthcare fraud: providers, medical employers, affiliates, and medical claims. The
implementation of ANNs allowed all four types of fraudulent entities to be identified at a
significantly quicker rate, thereby reducing the loss of insurance revenue. During a comparison
of the healthcare fraud detection performance of neural networks, logistic regression models, and
classification trees, the two-layer neural network was tested against the two alternative
supervised learning methods [22]. Using Clementine neural networks, variables were ranked
according to their classification importance through sensitivity analysis, and these rankings were
used in the construction of the ANN. The neural network algorithm correctly identified 100% of
the fraudulent hospitals, 91.47% of the normal hospitals, and had an overall correct identification
rate of 95.73%.
2.2.3

Classification Trees

Decision trees, which model decisions and their possible consequences, have been used
as a predictive tool to map features of healthcare claims to conclusions regarding fraudulence
and abnormality. When the target variable, indicating fraud or non-fraud, can only assume a
finite set of values, the decision tree is considered to be a classification tree. Within the structure
of a classification tree, external, leaf nodes represent the class labels of fraud and non-fraud,
while branches represent conjunctions of features from a medical claim that lead to those two
class labels. Each internal, non-leaf node is labeled with an input feature from a claim instance,
and the directed edges emanating from these nodes are labeled with each of the possible values
the features can potentially assume. Training data is used to construct an appropriate
classification tree, and the fraudulent nature of unidentified healthcare claims is predicted using
this logic model. Classification trees have been used by researchers in a comparative capacity to
identify fraudulent reporting of diabetic outpatient services, tested as an auditing strategy in the
fiscal and insurance domains, and generated using the C4.5 and C5.0 classification algorithms to
detect insurance subscribers’ fraud. Liou, Tang, and Chen found that a classification tree
correctly identified 100% of the fraudulent hospitals present in a set of data, 98.73% of the
normal hospitals in the dataset, and had an overall correct identification rate of 99.3% [22]. A
methodology for constructing profiles of fraudulent paying entities was proposed by Bonchi,
Giannotti, Mainetto, and Pedreschi [3]. The following methodological issues were identified in
this paper: defining of an audit cost model, monitoring the training-set construction, measuring
the quality of a classifier, and tuning the classifier construction. By properly addressing these
issues, the researchers were able to develop an effective decision support system for audit
planning. The hot spots methodology, introduced by Williams and Huang, involved clustering to
provide a first cut segmentation of the data [40]. Using C4.5 and C5.0, decision tree induction
and rule set pruning then assigned a rule to each segment of the data. These rules, coupled with
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the original data, were analyzed to find “nuggets,” subsets of the original data, which were
related in some way to the domain problem.
2.2.4

Logistic Regression

Shin, Park, Lee, and Jhee proposed a scoring model for a South Korean governmental
health insurance agency that detected outpatient clinics with abusive utilization patterns based on
profiling information extracted from electronic insurance claims [34]. Their model consisted of
scoring claims to quantify the degree of abusiveness and segmentation to categorize the
problematic providers with similar utilization patterns. Practitioner claims submitted to the
South Korean National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) for outpatient care during the 3rd
quarter of 2007 were used to construct the model, and data from the 4th quarter of 2007 was used
to validate the model. They compared the conditional probability distributions of the composite
degree of anomaly (CDA) score formulated for intervention and non-intervention groups. The
CDA aggregated 38 indicators of abusiveness for individual clinics, which were grouped based
on the CDAs. This combination of logistic regression and CDAs allowed Shin, Park, Lee, and
Jhee to improve upon the performance of existing fraud detection methods. As previously
mentioned, the detection performance of logistic regression was analyzed alongside neural
networks and classification trees by Liou, Tang, and Chen [22]. They determined while
classifications trees had an overall correct identification rate of 99%, neural networks had an
overall correct identification rate of 96%, and logistic regression had an overall correct
identification rate of 92%, all three algorithms performed quite accurately.
We chose to implement logistic regression models as the supervised, predictive element
of our fraud detection system due to their comparative simplicity. Although both classification
trees and neural networks were found to be more accurate, we discovered that they were much
more difficult to develop and implement. The straightforwardness of this statistical model
allowed us to closely monitor the addition and subtraction of covariates, and there were multiple
existing functions in R packages that performed logistic regression.
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2.3

Statistical Modeling Involving Unsupervised Learning

Unsupervised learning is a category of machine learning algorithms that uses unknown
data to draw inferences. An unknown dataset consists of input data instances without labeled
responses, meaning the latent variable is unknown. Using only the information provided by the
input attributes, unsupervised learning algorithms develop models that attempt to discover
hidden structure in the unlabeled data. Values are assigned to the response variable according to
the structure and patterns of the data that are found by the unsupervised learning algorithm.
2.3.1

Cluster Analysis

The purpose of cluster analysis is to group data into categories, classes, or clusters, so
that items within a particular cluster are similar in comparison to one another, but significantly
dissimilar to items in other clusters. By clustering elements of a set into two or more mutually
exclusive groups, it becomes more manageable to predict behavior or properties based on group
membership. A data matrix must first be constructed, where each medical claim is represented
by a row, and each feature of the claim is stored a column. Then, a table of relative similarities
or differences between all the claims can be developed, which is called the proximities matrix.
Within this matrix, both the rows and columns represent individual claims, and the value of each
element is a measurement of the similarity or difference between the two particular claims. The
measure of similarity on which the clusters are eventually modeled can be defined by Euclidean
distance, probabilistic distance, or other appropriate metrics. After the distances between all the
claims have been found, clustering occurs based on these distances. A clustering algorithm, such
as Hierarchical clustering (HCA), k-means clustering, Gaussian mixture models, or Selforganizing maps (SOM), is responsible for properly dividing the claims into clusters. In the
application of fraud detection, claims within clusters containing seemingly abnormal feature
values are typically flagged as fraudulent. Researchers have used various clustering algorithms
to detect different forms of healthcare fraud through cluster analysis. Demographically
homogenous zip code regions were created using clustering procedures, and each zip code region
was associated with a random variable that could discriminate between health care utilization.
[25]. He, Graco, and Yao coupled the K-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithm with a genetic
algorithm to detect Australian medical fraud [14]. The genetic algorithm determined the optimal
weights of features used to categorize General Practitioners’ practice profiles, and the KNN
algorithm used these weights to identify nearest neighbors. The results of this experiment were
promising, and the researchers recommended the implementation of this model in the Health
Insurance Commission’s fraud prevention system (fps). Within the UNISIM system, proposed
by Tang, Mendis, Murray, Hu, and Sutinen, the framework consisted of a feature extractor, a
cluster builder, a model constructor, and an outlier detector [36]. The purpose of the cluster
analysis within this system was to examine and label the data according to certain criteria. Every
sequence was first initialized as a cluster, nearest neighbors were merged based on density of
sequences, and a second merging process occurred based on the density of the clusters. Overall,
the unsupervised UNISIM system was proven to be an effective, yet complementary tool in the
detection of healthcare fraud.
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2.3.2

Association Rules

In an elemental sense, association rules are if/then statements that allow relationships
between seemingly unrelated data attributes to be exposed. An antecedent, the “if”, and a
consequent, the “then”, are the two components of an association rule. Antecedents are the
values of certain data attributes, and consequences are other feature values that are found in
combination with a particular antecedent. The association rules themselves are developed by
analyzing the data for frequent reasoning patterns, and then using the criteria support and
confidence to determine the most significant relationships. Criteria support indicates how
frequently the antecedent and consequent appear in the data, and confidence indicates the
number of times the antecedent/consequent combination has been found to be true. In the
application of fraud detection, medical claims that lack correspondence to any existing
association rules would be flagged as abnormal and further investigation would occur. The
detection of provider fraud through specialist billing was studied by Shan, Jeacocke, Murray, and
Sutinen using positive and negative association rules [31]. Rules were first identified by the
researchers, and then classified into two groups representing compliance and non-compliance by
a domain expert. Any claims that were not consistent with the compliance rules were considered
to be potentially fraudulent. This method was tested against a baseline classifier, and these rules
were validated after significantly outperforming the baseline. Another Australian researcher,
Williams, coupled rule induction and clustering to detect various forms of insurance subscribers’
fraud [39]. This research is closely related to research that Williams conducted with Huang two
years earlier in 1997. The results from [40] have already been discussed in Section 2.2.3.
2.3.3

Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection, or outlier detection, is the identification of cases which do not
conform to an expected pattern, or that are unusual within data that is seemingly homogeneous.
This statistical method performs quite well as a detection tool, because it was developed to
recognize rare events that may have great significance, but are hard to find within a large set of
data. Unsupervised anomaly detection techniques detect anomalies in an unlabeled test data set
under the assumption that the majority of the instances in the data set are normal by looking for
instances that seem to fit least to the remainder of the data set. The distance from the center of a
normal distribution indicates how typical a given point is with respect to the distribution of the
data. Each case can be ranked according to the probability that it is either typical or atypical.
Capelleveen tested the performance of an outlier detection method by analyzing its precision
predicting dental fraud [5]. Local density based outlier detection was used by Shan, Murray, and
Sutinen to study fraudulent Optometrist billing patterns, and by Tang, Mendis, Murray, Hu, and
Sutinen in conjunction with feature selection, clustering, and pattern recognition in their
proposed UNISIM system [32, 36].
Ngufor and Wojtusiak established the unsupervised data labeling capability of outlier
detection, and proposed a SynTwoMoving algorithm to label fraudulent healthcare data, which
incorporated concept drift [27]. Using this research as inspiration, we decided to label our
training data using an anomaly detection algorithm that incorporated this aspect of seasonality.
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3

Data Source and Preprocessing

3.1

Methodology

Since the emergence of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) and the subsequent increase
in the electronic submission of healthcare insurance claims, several states have established
databases that collect health insurance claims information from all paying entities into a
statewide information repository. The All-Payer Claims Databases (APCD) contain medical,
dental, and pharmaceutical claims data that can be used to report cost, use, and quality
information. The stored data is service-level information based on claims that have been
processed by various payers. Information considered to be service-level includes charges and
payments, the providers receiving payment, clinical diagnosis and procedure codes, and patient
demographics. The various payers include private health insurance companies, federally-funded
agencies such as Medicare and Medicaid, state employee health benefit programs, prescription
drug plans, dental insurance companies, and self-insured employer plans. At this time, ten states
have existing All-Payer Claims Databases: Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Most states offer limited use
datasets containing certain identifying features, and public use datasets that ensure patient
privacy by encrypting, aggregating, or suppressing all patient identifiers. We obtained the public
use APCD dataset for this research project from the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health
Care Information System (NHCHIS).
Once we received the dataset from Milliman, the vendor responsible for collecting,
cleaning, imputing, and transforming the data from the New Hampshire APCD, our first course
of action was to determine the types of fraud we could potentially detect using the information
provided by attributes in the data. After performing some basic analysis to become familiar with
the data, we decided to focus on detecting claims that billed for services not rendered or billed
for excessive or unnecessary services. The results from this initial data analysis are discussed in
Section 3.2.
Features of the dataset were then selected that would provide the algorithms being used
with the necessary information to identify instances of these fraudulent schemes. The predicting
capability of each available attribute was evaluated using literature written by domain experts
and the methodologies from previous research projects. The results of the feature selection
process, which provided the data elements for both the outlier detection and logistic regression
models, are included in Sections 5 and 6.
During the data auditing process, we learned that the vendor had redacted the exact
submission date of each claim due to privacy concerns. Time-series data was an input
requirement for the outlier detection package that had been chosen, so this lack of any temporal
indicator was troubling. Thankfully, we were able to determine through additional analysis that
the imputed service key value, generated by the vendor, was assigned to each claim according to
when the claim was processed and stored. This value was used to create a sort of pseudo-timestamp, and allowed us to organize the data in a sequential manner.
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The amount billed for each service record was also evaluated, and we discovered that this
currency field can be negative when a claim is reversed. Healthcare fraud is monetarily
motivated, so these type of records were eliminated from the dataset.

3.2

Data Analysis

The following experiment was conducted using a dataset from the New Hampshire
Comprehensive Health Care Information System (NHCHIS), an APCD system that is maintained
by the New Hampshire Insurance Department and the New Hampshire Department of Health and
Human Services. The NHCHIS began accepting claims submissions from paying entities in
2005, and currently collects medical claims data from commercial payers, third-party
administrators, Medicaid, and Medicare. We originally requested and received public use data
from 2005 through 2014, but eventually focused on claims from 2012 and 2013, due to their
recentness and completeness.
After importing the two years’ worth of NHCHIS information into a SQL Server
database, the structure of the data was analyzed. Each row in the table represents a service that
was provided and is being billed for by a provider within a healthcare insurance claim. An
individual service record in a claim can be uniquely identified by a service key, which was
generated by the warehouse during the data transformation process. Medical claims, containing
one or more service records, can be uniquely identified by a claim key that was assigned by
Milliman. Each claim describes the services rendered by a healthcare provider for an individual
patient during a particular period of time.
Including the claim and service keys, a single record is comprised of 63 data attributes
that describe the patient, the provider, the situation, the services provided, billing information,
insurance information, etc. Seven of the elements are identification keys that were generated by
the vendor for confidentiality or reference purposes. The other 56 elements of each row are
directly extracted from the claims data supplied by the healthcare insurance agencies and
companies cooperating with the NHCHIS.
Outpatient claims describing care that was provided to a patient who was not formally
admitted to a healthcare facility can be distinguished from inpatient claims according to certain
data attributes. Records containing non-null ICD-9 Procedure codes (ICD_PROC_01_PRI) are
classified as inpatient, while records with non-null CPT/HCPCS codes (PROC_CODE) are
considered to be outpatient. An inpatient flag (INPATIENT_FLAG) also indicates whether a
given service record is from an inpatient claim.
This project is motivated by the transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10, and inpatient claims
face a far more dramatic change, since both the diagnosis and procedure codes will be
transitioning. Therefore, we excluded outpatient claims from this experiment, and concentrated
solely on testing inpatient claims.
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4

Clinical Classification Software

4.1

Clinical Classification Methodology

Developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Clinical
Classifications Software (CCS) is a tool for clustering patient diagnoses and procedures into a
more manageable number of clinically meaningful categories. CCS provides a way to classify
diagnoses and procedures into a limited number of categories by aggregating individual ICD-9
and ICD-10 diagnosis, ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure, and Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT)/Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes into broad diagnosis and
procedure groups to facilitate statistical analysis and reporting. This grouping process makes it
easier to understand patterns of diagnoses and procedures so that organizations and researchers
can analyze costs, utilization, and outcomes associated with particular illnesses and procedures.
Single-level CCS categories, which are mutually exclusive, can be employed in many types of
projects analyzing data on diagnoses and procedures. For example, they can be used to3:

4.1.1

•

Identify cases for disease-specific or procedure-specific studies

•

Gain a better understanding of an institution's or health plan's distribution of patients
across disease or procedure groupings

•

Provide statistical information on characteristics, such as charges and length of stay,
about relatively specific conditions

•

Cross-classify procedures by diagnoses to provide insight into the variety of
procedures performed for particular diagnoses.

ICD-9 and ICD-10 Diagnosis Codes

The single-level ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnosis classification schemes both aggregate
mortality and morbidity into 285 mutually exclusive categories, most of which are clinically
homogeneous. Some heterogeneous categories are necessary; these combine several less
common individual conditions within a body system. Table 1 provides an example of a row in
the crosswalk from a group of analogous ICD-9 diagnosis codes to a single-level CCS category.
Table 1: Example of the Single-Level CCS Diagnosis Crosswalk
Description
ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes
CCS Category
HIV infection
042 0420 0421 0422 0429
5
0430 0431 0432 0433 0439
0440 0449 07953 27910
27919 79571 7958 V08
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4.1.2

ICD-9 and ICD-10 Procedure Codes

Single-level ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure classification schemes both contain 231
mutually exclusive categories. ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure codes are only used to describe
services in inpatient records and claims. The term inpatient refers to any procedure that requires
a patient to be admitted to a hospital, so the patient can be closely monitored during the
procedure and recovery process. Many of the categories represent single procedures; however,
some procedures that occur infrequently are grouped according to three dimensions: the relevant
body system, whether they are used for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, and whether they are
considered operating room or non-operating room procedures, according to diagnosis related
groups (DRG) definitions. Table 2 provides an example of a single row from the ICD-9 CCS
procedure crosswalk.
Table 2: Example of the Single-Level CCS ICD-9 Procedure Crosswalk
Description
ICD-9 Procedure Codes
CCS Category
Heart Valve Procedures
3500 3501 3502 3503 3504
43
3505 3506 3507 3508 3509
3510 3511 3512 3513 3514
3520 3521 3522 3523 3524
3525 3526 3527 3528 3596
3597 3599
4.1.3

CPT/HCPCS Codes

The CCS also provides a crosswalk for classifying Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT) codes and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes into procedure
categories. CPT, also referred to as HCPCS Level I, is used to describe outpatient procedures
performed by healthcare professionals. An outpatient procedure does not require hospital
admission, and may be performed off-site. HCPCS, also referred to as HCPCS Level II, is a
supplementary coding system developed by the CMS to designate supplies and services not
accounted for in the CPT code set. More than 9,000 CPT codes and 6,000 HCPCS codes are
grouped into 244 categories. Of these 244 categories, 231 are identical to the ICD-9 procedure
categories, and 13 are specific groups unique to the service and supply codes in the CPT/HCPCS
coding system. Instead of providing a crosswalk for each individual CPT/HCPCS code, CCSServices and Procedures classifies according to ranges of code values, which is illustrated in
Table 3.
Table 3: Example of the CCS-Services and Procedures Crosswalk
CPT/HCPCS Codes
CCS Category
Description
‘71250 – 71275’
178
CT scan chest
‘75571 – 75573’
‘S8032 – S8032’
‘S8093 – S8093’
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In every CCS crosswalk, the diagnosis and procedure codes are represented with implicit
decimals, which is fairly regular in the vast majority of healthcare data. In practice, ICD-9 and
ICD-10 codes are usually represented with explicit decimals, as mentioned in Section 1.1.

4.2

Clinical Classification Results

For this experiment, the claims data from 2012 was used as training data, and the claims
data from 2013 was used as the testing data. Using the CCS clinical classification schemes, each
service record was categorized according to the primary diagnosis and primary procedure codes.
This was done to appropriately group service records that have similar medical codes into
distinct categories that would have similar bill amounts and quantities of services provided.
Statistical analysis could then be performed in the future stages according to the CCS diagnosis
and CCS procedure categories. The crosswalks described in Section 4.1 were used to assign
each inpatient service record a diagnosis group number and a procedure group number. After all
the inpatient claims from both years were grouped according to CCS Diagnosis/CCS Procedure
combinations, the four groups with the largest number of claims, services, distinct diagnosis
codes, and distinct procedure codes from 2012 were ultimately selected.
Table 4: 2012 IDC-9 Clinical Classification
CCS
CCS
Number
Number of Number of Distinct
Diagnosis Procedure of Claims
Services
ICD-9 Diagnosis
Codes
203
152
1569
22845
10
193
140
1027
7640
11
205
158
647
8157
22
149
84
585
8180
26

Number of Distinct
ICD-9 Procedure
Codes
2
2
13
4

The same four CCS combinations from the 2013 inpatient claims were then selected, and
the service records from each group were stored in a separate database table.
CCS
CCS
Diagnosis Procedure
203
193
205
149

152
140
158
84

Table 5: 2013 ICD-9 Clinical Classification
Number
Number of Number of Distinct
of Claims
Services
ICD-9 Diagnosis
Codes
1959
28686
8
990
7172
8
607
7930
26
475
6540
25

17	
  
	
  

Number of Distinct
ICD-9 Procedure
Codes
2
3
13
3

5

Outlier Detection

5.1

Outlier Detection Methodology

In January 2015, Twitter released an open-source R package, AnomalyDetection, which
has the ability to detect anomalies in big data. Considered to be both practical and robust, this
package is intended to identify outliers in a set of time series data, and is cognizant of both
seasonality and underlying trends. Positive, negative, global, and local anomalies can all be
detected using the AnomalyDetection package. The use of time series decomposition and a
robust statistical metric allows the package to detect this range of anomalies. The underlying
algorithm, referred to as Seasonal Hybrid ESD, builds upon the Generalized ESD test for
detecting anomalies. For long time series, the algorithm employs piecewise approximation,
since the issue of trend extraction in the presence of anomalies is non-trivial, during the detection
process.
This package was originally designed for time series data, but can also be used to detect
anomalies in a vector of numerical values. This is extremely useful when the data is ordered
according to time, but the corresponding timestamps are not available. AnomalyDetection allows
the user to specify the direction of anomalies, the window of interest, enable/disable piecewise
approximation, and annotate the axes to assist in visual data representation and analysis. The
framework of Twitter’s AnomalyDetection package is explained in the following subsections.
5.1.1

Student T-Distribution

Suppose we select a random sample of size n from a normal population with mean µ and
variance σ2. Let 𝑥 represent the sample mean, and s represent the sample standard deviation.
Then the random variable:

𝑇!!! =   

!!  !
!
!

has a t-distribution with n - 1 degrees of freedom.

(1)

This probability distribution is typically used to estimate population parameters when the
population variance is unknown, or the sample size is small. When n is large (n > 40), a tstatistic will approximately follow a normal distribution, according to Central Limit Theory.
Often, the population standard deviation is unknown, but the sample standard deviation can be
calculated. The t-distribution allows researchers to conduct statistical analysis on this type of
datasets using the normal distribution. As the degrees of freedom increases, the t-density
approaches the normal density. This corresponds to the fact that the sample standard deviation s
approaches the population standard deviation σ for large n. When the degrees of freedom is
equal to 1,000, the critical values for the t-distribution are extremely close to the critical z-values
(1.962 versus 1.96, for example).
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T-density curves are also symmetric and bell-shaped like the normal distribution. However,
the spread is more than that of the normal distribution. This is due to the fact that in equation 4,
the denominator is s rather than σ. Since s is a random quantity varying with various samples,
Tn-1 has a higher degree of uncertainty, resulting in a larger spread.
5.1.2

Generalized ESD Test

The Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate (ESD) test is used to detect one or more
outliers in univariate data that follows an approximately normal distribution. The primary
limitation of the Grubbs’ test, the standard ESD test, is that the suspected number of outliers, k,
must be specified exactly by the researcher. If k is not set correctly, this can cause the
conclusion of the test to be misleading. The generalized derivation of the ESD test only requires
that an upper bound for the suspected number of outliers be specified. Given this upper bound, r,
the Generalized ESD test performs r separate tests: a test for one outlier, a test for two outliers, a
test of three outliers, etc., testing up to r outliers.
The Generalized ESD test is defined using the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 :
H1 :

There are no outliers in the dataset
There are between 1 and r outliers in the dataset

Test Statistic:

𝑅! =   

!"#!    !! !  !
!

(2)

For the test statistic Ri, 𝑥 and s denote the sample mean and the sample standard deviation. The
numerator 𝑚𝑎𝑥!    𝑥! −    𝑥 indicates the point farthest away from the sample mean.
Using the sample data, the observation that maximizes 𝑥! −    𝑥 is removed, and the test
statistic is recomputed with n - 1 observations, resulting in the recalculation of the sample mean
and sample standard deviation. This iterative procedure is repeated until r observations have
been removed. At the conclusion of this process, r test statistics have been constructed, R1, R2,
R3 …, Rr.
Critical Region: For each of the r test statistics:

𝜆! =   

!!!   !!,!!!!!
!
!!!!!!  !!,!!!!!
(!!!!!)

i = 1, 2, 3, …, r

(3)

The variable n represents the sample size of the dataset, and tp,n –i-1 is the 100p critical value of
the t-distribution with n – i – 1 degrees of freedom. The variable p is equal to:
!

𝑝 = 1 −    !  (!!!!!)

α = designated significance level
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(4)

The number of outliers is ultimately determined by finding the largest i, such that the test statistic
Ri is greater than the critical value λi.
5.1.3

Seasonality

The Generalized ESD test requires input data that follows an approximately normal
distribution, but real-world time series data frequently has seasonality, regular or semi-regular
cyclic variations that can affect statistical analysis. Seasonal Trend Decomposition using
Locally-Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (STL), designed to handle fixed seasonal periods, splits
time series data into three separate elements: a seasonal component, a trend component, and a
remainder component. The seasonal component of the original data is found using LocallyWeighted Scatterplot Smoothing (LOESS). The primary purpose of LOESS is the removal of
“jaggedness” from data using local regression. These seasonal values are removed from the data,
and the trend component is found by smoothing the remaining data. The remainder component,
the residual data produced by removing both the seasonal and trend components, follows an
approximately normal distribution. The Generalized ESD test can then be applied to this
remaining data in order to detect anomalies.

5.2

Outlier Detection Results

The AnomalyDetectionTs function, found in Twitter’s AnomalyDetection package,
detects anomalies in seasonal univariate time series data where the input is a series of
<timestamp, observation> pairs. This technique requires the timestamp to be in the YYYY-MMDD HH-MM-SS format. Our pseudo-timestamp generated from the imputed service key did
provide a temporal indictor, but was not in a standard timestamp format. Therefore, the
AnomalyDetectionVec function, which does not require a timestamp input, was used instead.
Outliers can still be identified in seasonal univariate time series data, but the input is a series of
observations in sequential order.
According to previous methodologies, most supervised learning fraud detection systems
that have been used by researchers rely on training data that has each claim, not each service
record within a claim, identified as fraudulent or non-fraudulent [8, 9]. Therefore, during this
data labeling process, the sum of the amounts billed divided by the quantities for the service
records within an individual claim was identified as the primary feature for the univariate outlier
detection process. Dividing the amount billed by the quantity of services, and summing these
results for each claim provided a normalized total amount value that could be properly compared
to other total values.
For each of the four CCS Diagnosis/Procedure combinations, the claims were ordered in
ascending order according to their imputed service key. After the claims were in proper
chronological order, the corresponding sums of the amounts billed divided by the quantities for
the claims were stored in four separate R dataframes. The AnomalyDetectionVec function was
then used to detect anomalies according to the total bill amount. Claims that were identified as
anomalies by this package were marked as fraud in the SQL Server database.
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Table 6: Anomaly Detection Variables
Parameter
Description
X
Time series as a column data frame, list, or vector,
where the column consists of the observations
max_anoms
Maximum number of anomalies that S-H-ESD will
detect as a percentage of the data
direction
Directionality of the anomalies to be detected
alpha
The level of statistical significance with which to accept
or reject anomalies
period
Defines the number of observations in a single period,
and used during seasonal decomposition

Parameter Value
List of

!"#$%&  !"##$%
!"#$%&%'

0.05 (5%)
Positive
0.05
#  of  Claims
12

The AnomalyDetectionVec function requires a number of input values that were
subsequently used in the Seasonal Hybrid ESD test. The maximum number of anomalies as a
percentage of the data was set to 0.05, or 5%, for this detection process. This threshold
corresponds to the results published by Liou, Tang, and Chen, which indicated that 3% to 4% of
healthcare claims were fraudulent or abusive [22]. Other research groups uncovered similar
levels of fraud, ranging anywhere from 0.8% to 10% [17, 28]. We did not dynamically test this
threshold value during our experiment, because this process of detecting outliers was used
simply for unsupervised labeling for supervised learning purposes, not for the final detection of
fraudulent instances. The directionality of the anomalies was set as positive, since healthcare
fraud is motivated by monetary gain. The alpha level was set as 0.05, indicating that anomalies
would be selected or rejected with a 95% confidence level. The period, which defines the
number of observations per period and is used during seasonal decomposition, was determined
by dividing the total number of claims by twelve. The anomaly results for each group can be
found below in Table 7.
Table 7: CCS Outlier Detection Results
CCS
CCS
Fraudulent Total
Percent
Fraudulent
Total
Percent
Diagnosis Procedure
Claims
Claims Fraudulent Services Services Fraudulent
203
152
13
1569
0.83
227
22845
0.99
193
140
51
1027
4.97
498
7640
6.52
205
158
29
647
4.48
309
8157
3.79
149
84
10
585
1.71
323
8180
3.95
TOTALS:
103
3828
2.69
1357
46822
2.90
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6

ICD-9 and ICD-10 General Equivalence Mappings

6.1

General Equivalence Mapping Methodology

General Equivalence Mappings (GEMs) are medical coding crosswalks that were
developed and published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services4. With the
implementation date of the tenth medical classification revision nearing, GEMs are practical and
useful translational dictionaries that provide acceptable ICD-10 alternatives to ICD-9 codes, and
vice-versa. The intention of these mappings is to offer translations that preserve the complete
meaning of the original medical codes being translated.
The upcoming transition to ICD-10 will not affect every type of medical code. ICD-9
diagnosis codes will be replaced by ICD-10 diagnosis codes, ICD-9 procedure codes will be
replaced by ICD-10 procedure codes, but CPT/HCPCS codes will remain the same. Therefore,
translational crosswalks only exist for ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes.
While determining the target codes that would correspond to potential source codes, the
CMS attempted to honor the National Library of Medicine (NLM) standard regarding the
conversion between coding systems. The NLM believes although it is possible to accurately
map from specific concepts to more general concepts, it is impossible to use mappings to add
specificity when the original information only addresses general concepts. However, this NLM
standard does not supersede the primary purpose of the GEM, which is to provide an acceptable
translation for every source system code in both code sets. These mappings do include target
system alternatives that are more specific than the source system when better alternatives are not
available. Therefore, the crosswalks between ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnosis and procedure codes
contain one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-one mappings. Even though non-optimal one-tomany mappings exist, each target code is considered to be an acceptable translation of the source
code by the CMS.
Tables 8 and 9 provide sample rows from both the diagnosis and procedure mapping
schemes. The Source column contains ICD-9 codes, and the Target column yields the equivalent
ICD-10 code(s) for each ICD-9 code. These tables also illustrate the two possible cases that
could occur during translation: one-to-one mappings and one-to-many mappings.
Table 8: Example of a One-to-One ICD-9 Procedure Mapping
ICD-9 Code (Source)
ICD-10 Code (Target)
5283
0FYG0Z2
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Table 9: Example of a One-to-Many ICD-9 Diagnosis Mapping
ICD-9 Code (Source)
ICD-10 Code (Target)
07989
B338
07989
B341
07989
B342
07989
B344
07989
B348
07989
B9719
07989
B9729
07989
B9789

6.2

General Equivalence Mapping Results

After the GEM crosswalks had been imported in the database, the diagnosis and
procedure codes from each individual service were translated from ICD-9 to ICD-10 using basic
SQL join statements. The original ICD-9 data from the four selected CCS combinations is
described in Table 10. Table 11 contains information regarding the corresponding ICD-10 data
that was derived from the Table 10 data. Certain CCS groups, such as 149/84, had little to no
one-to-many mappings, while others, such as 205/158, produced a significant number of one-tomany mappings.
Table 10: ICD-9 Pre-General Equivalency Mapping
CCS
CCS
Number
Number of Number of Distinct Number of Distinct
Diagnosis Procedure of Claims
Services
ICD-10 Diagnosis
ICD-10 Procedure
Codes
Codes
203
152
1959
28686
8
2
193
140
990
7172
8
3
205
158
607
7930
26
13
149
84
475
6540
25
3
Table 11: ICD-10 Post-General Equivalency Mapping
CCS
CCS
Number
Number of Number of Distinct Number of Distinct
Diagnosis Procedure of Claims
Services
ICD-10 Diagnosis
ICD-10 Procedure
Codes
Codes
203
152
1959
516807
8
26
193
140
990
71088
8
28
205
158
607
311777
37
313
149
84
475
6540
25
4
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7

Logistic Regression

7.1

Logistic Regression Methodology

The statistical process of logistic regression models the relationship between the
dependent variable and one or more independent feature variables from the data. Both the fit of
the model as well as the significance of the relationships between the dependent and independent
variables can be analyzed using this approach. Its ultimate purpose is to estimate the probability
of an event occurring, such as the probability a particular claim being fraudulent. However, the
dependent variable, predicted using the probability ascertained from the relevant independent
variables, is not a precise numerical value. The dependent variable is typically dichotomous in a
logistic regressive setting, so the outcome can either be a “1,” signaling that the claim is
fraudulent for example, or a “0,” indicating non-fraudulence.
For this project, a multivariate logistic regression model is used. Let π(x) represent the
probability of an event that depends on p independent variables. Then, using the inverse logit for
modeling the probability:

𝜋 𝑥 =   

! !! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!

(5)

!!  ! !! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!

This form is identical to univariate logistic regression, but there is now more than one
independent variable. To obtain the corresponding logit function from this, let X represent the
set of covariates X1, X2, …, Xp and using basic algebra:

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋

= ln   

! !
!!  ! !

= ln   

  

(6)

! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
! !
! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
!!  ! !
! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
! !

!!  

  

! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
!!  ! !

! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
! !
! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
!!  ! !
!
  
!! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !!
!!  !

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋

= ln   

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋

= ln[𝑒!! !!! !! !!! !! !⋯!!! !! ]

𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋

=    𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑋! + 𝛽! 𝑋! + ⋯ + 𝛽! 𝑋!
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(7)

Just like univariate logistic regression, the probability of a binary event given X is a
simple linear function. Equation 5 calculates the probability of an outcome event given the
covariate values X1 through Xp. Using logit transformation to convert the dichotomous outcome,
Equation 7 becomes a standard linear regression model. Logit transformation changes the range
of π(x) from 0 to 1 to -∞ to ∞.

7.2 Logistic Regression Results
The manufacturing of the labeled training data using the anomaly detection process
discussed in Section 5 allowed us to use supervised learning methods to predict probable
instances of fraud in inpatient claims from 2013. The glm function from the R package stats was
used to construct a logistic regression model for each CCS diagnosis/procedure grouping using
the 2012 training data. The appropriate model was then applied to the corresponding ICD-9 data
from 2013, and service records with a probability greater than 0.1, or 10%, were flagged. The
covariates used within the logistic regression models are listed below.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Primary ICD Diagnosis Code
Primary ICD Procedure Code
Amount Billed
Quantity
!"#$%&  !"##$%
!"#$%&%'

6. Discharge Status
7. Age
8. Sex
The logit formula uses covariates from the data to calculate the probability of fraud.
These independent variables were selected according to the logic of Diagnosis-Related Grouping
(DRG), a system of clinical classification that is used by Medicare, Medicaid, and private
insurance companies to determine the appropriate cost of inpatient services. DRG labels are
assigned through a black box based on the primary ICD-9 diagnosis code, the primary ICD-9
procedure code, the age of the patient, the sex of the patient, the discharge status, and the
presence of complications or comorbidities. Fraud detection researchers have previously used
DRGs coupled with the amount billed to detect instances of healthcare fraud [19, 22]. Every
data attribute contributing to DRG classification, with the exception of the presence of
complications, was present in our data. Ideally, a variable indicating complications would have
also been used, but the absence of this particular variable did not impact the predictive power of
the other DRG-related metrics. These independent variables, along with the cost, quantity, and
the subtotal, which was calculated by dividing the cost by the quantity, were selected as the
covariates for the logistic regression analysis. The coefficients section of the summary describes
each of the covariates that were used in the regression function. In Table 12 below, the diagnosis
code, the procedure code, the quantity, the subtotal, the discharge status, the age of the patient,
and the sex of the patient were all determined to be statistically significant predictors, according
to the p-values provided in the Associated P-Value column.
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Table 12: CCS 205/158 ICD-9 Logistic Regression Model
Covariate
Wald Z-Statistic
Associated P-Value
Intercept
Diagnosis Code

-5.213

Procedure Code

5.205

Amount Billed
Quantity
Normalized Claim Total

-0.640
-2.957
5.951

Discharge Status
Age

2.038
-5.918

Sex

-7.290

***

-16

***

-7

***

1.86 x 10

-10.654

Significance

-7

< 2 x 10

1.94 x 10
0.52216
0.00311

-9

2.67 x 10
0.04155

-9

3.27 x 10

-13

3.09 x 10

**
***
*
***
***

Table 13: CCS 205/158 ICD-10 Logistic Regression Model
Covariate

Wald Z-Statistic

Associated P-Value

Significance

Intercept

-2.617

0.008858

**

Amount Billed

-0.759

0.447837

Quantity

-3.406

0.000658

Normalized Claim Total

5.411

Discharge Status

1.754

6.27 x 10
0.079472

Age

-7.376

1.64 x 10

Sex

-8

-13

-16

-8.927

< 2 x 10

***
***
.
***
***

These logistic regression models were also used to predict the probability of fraud for the
service records in the four CCS groups from the 2013 inpatient claims that had been translated to
ICD-10. Since the models were trained using ICD-9 training data, the factor levels for the
primary diagnosis code and primary procedure code only contained ICD-9 codes. The models
adjusted to the introduction of ICD-10 by dropping the diagnosis code and procedure code as
predictors, relying on the remaining six covariates to calculate the probability of fraud.
This logistic regression model was trained using the same CCS 205/158 training data, but
eliminated the diagnosis and procedure codes from the formula. The discharge status becomes
less statistically significant and the quantity becomes more statistically significant, which can be
seen in Table 13. The loss of these two covariates does affect the predicting power and accuracy
of the model, and this notion is established in the following subsection.
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8

Results

8.1

ICD-9 versus ICD-10

The logistic regression models developed for the ICD-9 testing data used the eight
covariates mentioned earlier to predict the probability of service records being fraudulent. Any
service with a probability greater than or equal to 0.1 was flagged in the database.
CCS
Diagnosis
203
193
205
149

CCS
Procedure
152
140
158
84

Table : ICD-9 Fraud Results
Number of
Total Number of
Fraudulent Services
Services
86
28686
771
7172
453
7930
374
6540

Percent
Fraudulent (%)
0.30
10.75
5.71
5.72

The adjusted regression analysis relied on six covariates to detect possible fraud in the
same testing data that was used for the ICD-9 test. Since the CCS classification software uses
the same categories for ICD-9 and ICD-10 and every ICD-10 equivalent mapped to the expected
CCS group with 100% accuracy, the data was reduced down to the ICD-9 testing data, minus the
diagnosis and procedure codes, which eliminated the repetition of services.
CCS
Diagnosis
203
193
205
149

CCS
Procedure
152
140
158
84

Table : ICD-10 Fraud Results
Number of
Total Number of
Fraudulent Services
Services
85
28686
692
7172
288
7930
210
6540

Percent
Fraudulent (%)
0.30
9.65
3.63
3.21

Table 6 contains a comparison of the service records flagged as fraudulent using the ICD9 regression models versus the ICD-10 regression models. For each CCS combination, the ICD10 regression models, which lacked the diagnosis and procedure covariates, identified less
service records as being fraudulent. CCS groups containing a higher number of distinct
diagnosis and procedure codes had a more significant discrepancy in the services flagged, while
the CCS group 203/152, which contained only 5 distinct diagnosis codes and 1 distinct procedure
code, had little discrepancy.
CCS
Diagnosis
203
193
205
149

CCS
Procedure
152
140
158
84

Table : Comparison of Fraud Results
ICD-9 Fraud
ICD-10 Fraud
Both Fraud
Only
Only
3
2
83
131
52
640
295
130
158
218
54
156
27	
  

	
  

Neither
Fraud
28598
6349
7347
6112

9

Conclusions

The preliminary results from our experiment indicate that the unavailability of diagnosis
and procedure codes as metrics for a supervised and predictive fraud detection system such as a
logistic regression model does have an effect on the identification of fraudulent and nonfraudulent inpatient healthcare claims. If a supervised learning method is not trained using
labeled ICD-10 data, the predictive power of the diagnosis and procedure codes goes to waste.
Even with the presence of a clinical grouper that was compatible for both ICD-9 and ICD-10
codes, the performance of the fraud detection system we implemented still suffered when these
two covariates were eliminated.
As the ICD-10 implementation date continues to approach, fraud detection systems that
only utilize a small number of metrics or were trained using only ICD-9 data are potentially at
risk to experience this transitional impact. However, agencies and companies that have properly
prepared their fraud detection systems for this deadline will be able to enjoy the specificity and
the predictive power ICD-10 codes provide.

10

Limitations and Future Work

The nature of the data that we used caused various limitations within the project. A lack
of known instances of fraud and abuse within the dataset was the most glaring issue with the
APCD data. Most research groups exploring the field of healthcare fraud detection work in
conjunction with a health insurance company or agency, and this governmental or private entity
typically has access to fraudulent claims data. Developing our own fraud detection system
without labeled training data proved to be quite challenging, since we were unable to verify our
models in any way.
Healthcare data that is available to the public has a significant amount of information
redacted or concealed, due to privacy concerns. Researchers have reported a large number of
data attributes as valuable features for any fraud detection method, but many of these predictive
attributes were not included in the APCD data. Therefore, we were forced to use the basic set of
DRG classifiers as the covariates for logistic regression.
Public use data maintained by organizations such as the APCD, the Research Data
Assistance Center (ResDAC), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) better serves research involving healthcare
costs, quantity and quality of treatment, morbidity and mortality patterns, and hospital utilization.
The sensitive nature of healthcare fraud stemming from legality issues causes any known
fraudulent instances to be withheld from publically available claims data. Therefore, within our
system, we were flagging claims based on abnormality, rather than abusiveness. This type of
healthcare data is quite valuable in a variety of research fields, but its usefulness is limited in the
detection and prevention of healthcare fraud.
The system used to store the data and run the experiment was also limiting. Storing,
accessing, and manipulating 141 GB worth of data in a local SQL Server database on a desktop
computer was less than optimal. The original set of 184 million healthcare service records from
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2005 through 2014 had to be reduced down to the 43 million records from 2012 and 2013. Of
those 43 million records, approximately 9% were inpatient claims, but R was still unable to
consistently handle accessing 3.87 million claims from a database. We ultimately had to settle
on using a small subset of inpatient claims from 2012 and 2013 for our experiment.
The natural next step of this project would be to test this idea of a transitional impact
using fraud detection systems currently being implemented within the industry. Large health
insurance companies and governmental agencies have likely been preparing for this transition to
ICD-10 for years, and the necessary adjustments to their fraud detection algorithms and systems
have been made. Smaller healthcare insurance entities that rely on simplistic or outdated
methods, however, could experience issues regarding the accurate detection of fraud. Testing the
capabilities of these smaller or older systems using ICD-10 claims could reveal deficiencies that
need to be addressed before the transition to ICD-10 occurs.
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11

Appendices

11.1 Sample of Claims Data Format
COVERAGE_CLASS FROM_YEAR
Field Position 1
Field Position
2
VARCHAR(3)
VARCHAR(4)

ADM_YR
Field
Position 3
INT(4)

DIS_YR CLAIM_ID_KEY
Field
Field Position 5
Position 4
INT(4)
NUMERIC(12)

…
….
…

Coverage Class (COVERAGE_CLASS): This field indicated the type of record. For all medical
claims records, this value will be MED. Pharmacy Claims are PHM. Dental Claims are DEN.
Date of Service (From) Year (FROM_YEAR): This field contains the date of service of medical
claims in a CCYY format. Its source is the Date of Service from element (MC059) in the
medical claims.
Admission Year (ADM_YR): This field contains the year of the inpatient admission in CCYY
format; Its source is the Admission Date element (MC018) in the medical claims file. These are
only populated when valid codes include:
0….Not an inpatient record
-1…Not specified (No discharge date reported)
-2…Not valid (Invalid discharge date code reported)
Discharge Year (DIS_YR): This field contains the year of the inpatient discharge from the
hospital in CCYY format; Its source is the Discharge Date element (MC069) in the medical
claims file. In addition to dates in CCYY format, valid codes also include:
0….Not an inpatient record
-1…Not specified (No discharge date reported)
-2…Not valid (Invalid discharge date code reported)
Claim Key (CLAIM_ID_KEY): Unique identifier for the claim within the data warehouse.
(This is just a sample of the first five elements of the data. This table continues to include the
other 58 remaining attributes.)

11.2 Data Auditing Queries
(Note: The same queries were used for both 2012 and 2013 data subsets.)
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET MY_KEY = CAST(CONCAT(SUBSTRING(IMPUTED_SERVICE_KEY,1,4), '.',
SUBSTRING(IMPUTED_SERVICE_KEY,6,10)) AS FLOAT);
DELETE FROM CLAIM_2013
WHERE AMT_BILLED <= 0.00 OR QTY <= 0;
30	
  
	
  

11.3 Clinical Classification Queries
(Note: The same queries were used for both 2012 and 2013 data subsets.)
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_DX = ccs.CCS
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_ICD9DX_CCSXW ccs
ON cl.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY = ccs.ICD9_DX
WHERE cl.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY != ''
AND CCS_DX IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_dx = 'NO_ICD'
WHERE ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY = ''
AND CCS_DX IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_dx = 'INVALID'
WHERE ccs_dx IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_PROC = ccs.CCS
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_ICD9P_CCSXW ccs
ON cl.ICD_PROC_01_PRI = ccs.ICD9_PROC
WHERE cl.ICD_PROC_01_PRI != ''
AND CCS_PROC IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_proc = 'NO_ICD'
WHERE ICD_PROC_01_PRI = ''
AND CCS_PROC IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_proc = 'INVALID'
WHERE ccs_proc IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_CPT = cpt.CCS
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_CPT_CCSXW cpt
ON cl.proc_code = cpt.cpt
WHERE cl.proc_code != ''
AND CCS_CPT IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_cpt = 'NO_CPT'
WHERE proc_code = ''
AND CCS_CPT IS NULL;
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UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET ccs_cpt = 'INVALID'
WHERE ccs_cpt IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_FLAG = 'IGNORE'
WHERE ccs_cpt != 'NO_CPT'
AND ccs_cpt != 'INVALID'
AND ccs_proc != 'NO_ICD'
AND ccs_proc != 'INVALID';
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_FLAG = 'CPT'
WHERE ccs_cpt != 'NO_CPT'
AND ccs_cpt != 'INVALID'
AND CCS_FLAG IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_FLAG = 'PROC'
WHERE ccs_proc != 'NO_ICD'
AND ccs_proc != 'INVALID'
AND CCS_FLAG IS NULL;
UPDATE CLAIM_2013
SET CCS_FLAG = 'NO_CCS'
WHERE CCS_FLAG IS NULL;
SELECT TOP (10) COUNT(services_key), CCS_DX, CCS_CPT
FROM CLAIM_2012
WHERE CCS_FLAG = 'CPT'
GROUP BY CCS_DX, CCS_CPT
ORDER BY COUNT(services_key) DESC;
SELECT TOP (10) COUNT(services_key), CCS_DX, CCS_PROC
FROM CLAIM_2012
WHERE CCS_FLAG = 'PROC'
GROUP BY CCS_DX, CCS_PROC
ORDER BY COUNT(services_key) DESC;
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11.4 Distributions of Selected CCS Combinations
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11.5 Outlier Detection Plots
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11.6 Outlier Detection Queries and R Code
(Note: The same queries and code were used for all four CCS groups.)
SELECT Claim.CCS_DX, Claim.CCS_PROC, Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY,
Claim.SERVICES_KEY, Claim.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY, Claim.ICD_PROC_01_PRI,
Claim.REV_CODE, Claim.AMT_BILLED, Claim.QTY, Amount.TOTAL, Claim.DIS_STAT,
Claim.AGE, Claim.SEX, Claim.MY_KEY, RowCalc.ROW_NUM
FROM CLAIM_2012 AS Claim, (SELECT CLAIM_ID_KEY,
ROUND(SUM(AMT_BILLED/QTY),2) AS TOTAL FROM CLAIM_2012 WHERE CCS_DX
= '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND AMT_BILLED > 0 AND
QTY > 0 GROUP BY CLAIM_ID_KEY) AS Amount,
(SELECT CLAIM_ID_KEY, ROW_NUMBER () OVER (ORDER BY MY_KEY ASC) AS
ROW_NUM FROM CLAIM_2012 WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND
CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND AMT_BILLED > 0 AND QTY > 0 GROUP BY CLAIM_ID_KEY,
MY_KEY) AS RowCalc
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND
AMT_BILLED > 0 AND QTY > 0 AND Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY = Amount.CLAIM_ID_KEY
AND Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY = RowCalc.CLAIM_ID_KEY
ORDER BY ROW_NUM;
SELECT TOTAL
FROM TRAINING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152'
GROUP BY ROW_NUM, TOTAL
ORDER BY ROW_NUM ASC;
con <- odbcConnect("HealthcareData")
query1 <- paste0("SELECT TOTAL
FROM TRAINING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152'
GROUP BY ROW_NUM, TOTAL
ORDER BY ROW_NUM ASC;")
Results1 <- sqlQuery(con, query1)
Fraud1 <- AnomalyDetectionVec(Results1,
max_anoms = 0.05,
direction = "pos",
alpha = 0.05,
period = 131,
plot = T,
y_log = T,
xlabel = "",
ylabel = "")
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Fraud1
for (row in 1:nrow(Fraud1$anoms)) {
query <- paste0(
"Update TRAINING
SET TRAINING.FRAUD = 1
WHERE TRAINING.CCS_DX = '203' AND TRAINING.CCS_PROC = '152' AND
TRAINING.ROW_NUM = ", Fraud1$anoms$index[row], ";"
)
sqlQuery(con, query)
}
Update TRAINING
SET TRAINING.FRAUD = 0
WHERE TRAINING.FRAUD IS NULL;
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11.7 Logistic Regression R Code
(Note: The same code was used for all four CCS groups.)
query11 <- paste0("SELECT ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY AS DIAGNOSIS,
ICD_PROC_01_PRI AS 'PROCEDURE', AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY,
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX, FRAUD
FROM TRAINING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = ‘152';")
Results11 <- sqlQuery(con, query11)
Logit11 <- glm(FRAUD ~ DIAGNOSIS + PROCEDURE + COST + QUANTITY +
SUBTOTAL + STATUS + AGE + SEX, data = Results1, family = "binomial")
query21 <- paste0("SELECT AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY,
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX, FRAUD
FROM TRAINING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = ‘152';")
Results21 <- sqlQuery(con, query21)
Logit21 <- glm(FRAUD ~ COST + QUANTITY + SUBTOTAL + STATUS + AGE + SEX,
data = Results21, family = "binomial")
query12 <- paste0("SELECT SERVICES_KEY, ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY AS DIAGNOSIS,
ICD_PROC_01_PRI AS 'PROCEDURE', AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY,
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX
FROM TESTING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203';")
Predict12 <- sqlQuery(con, query12)
Predict12$fraudICD9 <- predict(Logit11, newdata = Predict12, type = "response")
query22 <- paste0("SELECT SERVICES_KEY, AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS
QUANTITY, (AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX
FROM TESTING
WHERE CCS_DX = '203';")
Predict22 <- sqlQuery(con, query22)
Predict22$fraudICD10 <- predict(Logit21, newdata = Predict22, type = "response")
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11.8 Logistic Regression Models
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